Friday, May 22, 2020

The Plan and The Team


It was on this day...

On May 22, BGen Bautista received a call from Lt Gen Galvez. He was informed that an inbound Intelligence Team from Zamboanga will present an intelligence packet (Intel Packet) containing information that confirms the sighting of Abu Sayyaf Group leader Isnilon Hapilon in a house at Brgy. Basak Malutlot in Marawi City.

This information would significantly change the configuration of all active military operations in the immediate vicinity of Marawi and eventually in Mindanao.

The Intel Team arrived at 10 p.m. from Zamboanga, together with the forces from the Joint Special Operations Unit 3 (JSOU3), Naval Special Operations Group (NAVSOG), and the 4th Light Reaction Company (4LRC).

After presentation of their Intel Packet, BGen Bautista immediately ordered the team to conduct a mission planning and to present the output to him as soon as it was done. The Intel Team quickly buckled down to work and finished an action plan by 2 a.m., ready for presentation to BGen Bautista. 

All concerns and considerations needed to be taken in and weighed. A thorough planner, BGen Bautista asked the team about the number of expected enemy fighters they were likely to engage. The Team confifirmed about 16 persons in total. 

BGen Bautista asked for the exact position of the priority targets, particularly the high value targets (HVT) in the area to further validate the information on the target’s location. Based on their assessment and on what was indicated in the Intel Packet, the Team confirmed that the targets were in a 3-story, heavily fortified safe house that was made to look like an ordinary house in the area.

BGen Bautista asked the Team if there was a planned-tactical fallback in case the first plan failed or if in case the assault teams were pinned down. The Team gave an ingenious and tactically practical rollover plan as their solution to the said scenarios. All possible angles were deliberated upon. Incisive exchange of ideas during operational planning, especially prior to execution, proved necessary and well-appreciated by every well-meaning operative... 

...Still concerned, BGen Bautista asked for the operation’s timeframe. His other important consideration was the avoidance of collateral damage. As much as possible, he did not want any non-combatant casualty or unnecessary damage to civilian property. The Team replied they intend to complete the mission within 30 minutes, barring unfavorable hitches in the execution.

BGen Bautista understood well the capability of the Team since they were all part of the SOF family. Being a Scout Ranger himself who continuously works with the SOF, he was confident the Team would execute the plan, regardless of the odds.

With all the necessary preparations made, BGen Bautista decided to oversee operations from his TCP in Saguiaran town in Lanao del Sur to give ground commanders enough leeway and for him to have time to attend to other active military operations in his area of responsibility. 

Originally, the assault was to be executed at 8 a.m. on May 23... 


*To be continued...

--NO MAN LEFT BEHIND (2018)


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